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I. INTRODUCTION
Justice Kennedy became an Associate Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court on
1
February 18, 1988. Since then, the Supreme Court has decided numerous
significant cases, established important legal tests and doctrines in many fields,
and employed various principles for interpreting statutes and the Constitution.
This Symposium serves a valuable purpose in investigating the many ways in
which Justice Kennedy has contributed to the Court’s jurisprudence.
My Article concerns one aspect of Justice Kennedy’s opinions, namely, his
use of sources of the original meaning of the Constitution. The phrase “sources of
the original meaning of the Constitution,” refers to the records from the Federal
* Professor of Law, George Washington University Law School. Law Clerk to Justice Kennedy, 1989–
1990. I wrote this Article for the McGeorge Law Review’s Symposium on “The Evolution of Justice Anthony
M. Kennedy’s Jurisprudence,” held at the McGeorge Law School on April 6, 2012. I am very grateful to the
McGeorge Law Review for including me in this Symposium, and to Justice Kennedy for the great assistance he
has given me in many ways over the past twenty-five years.
1. Biographies of Current Justices of the Supreme Court, SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES,
http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/biographies.aspx (last visited July 27, 2012) (on file with the McGeorge
Law Review).

77

04_MAGGS_VER_01_5-18-12_FINAL.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)

7/22/2013 2:33 PM

2013 / Use of Sources of the Original Meaning of the Constitution
Constitutional Convention of 1787, the records of the state ratifying conventions,
the Federalist Papers, dictionaries showing usage of language during the
founding period, and the acts of the First Congress. The goals of this Article are
first to identify, quote, and describe passages in which Justice Kennedy has cited
these sources, and second to draw conclusions about what these passages show.
Although I clerked for Justice Kennedy in the October 1989 Term and have
spoken with him regularly since then, he and I have not discussed this particular
subject. My assessment is based solely on his written opinions.
My observations lead me to three conclusions. First, Justice Kennedy
believes that sources of the original meaning of the Constitution are important,
but he does not rely on them frequently. Only twenty-two opinions written by
Justice Kennedy cite the Federalist Papers, the records of the Constitutional
Convention, the records of the state ratifying conventions, or the Acts of the First
Congress. Second, when Justice Kennedy cites sources of the original meaning of
the Constitution, he usually uses the sources to confirm background principles
rather than to resolve the specific issues before the Court. Third, Justice Kennedy
is not opposed to using sources of the original meaning of the Constitution to
resolve specific issues, but has done so in very few cases. These observations, as
discussed below, may have significance for both constitutional scholars and
litigants before the Court.
II. WHY THE SUBJECT MIGHT BE IMPORTANT
Investigating Justice Kennedy’s reliance on sources of the original meaning
of the Constitution is important for three reasons. First, constitutional scholars
disagree on whether Justice Kennedy is an “originalist” in constitutional
interpretation. An originalist judge is one who decides constitutional issues based
on the original meaning of the Constitution. Prominent scholars have expressed
different views on how to characterize Justice Kennedy. For example, Dean
2
Erwin Chemerinsky labels Justice Kennedy an originalist, while others such as
3
Professors Jamal Greene and Steven Calabresi say that he is not an originalist.
By assessing Justice Kennedy’s reliance on sources of the original meaning, this
Article may help resolve this issue.

2. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Against Sovereign Immunity, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1201, 1210 (2001)
(discussing “originalists such as Justices Scalia and Kennedy”).
3. See Jamal Greene, How Constitutional Theory Matters, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 1183, 1190 (2011)
(“[N]either of the Court’s swing Justices for the last quarter century, Justice O’Connor and Justice Kennedy, is
an originalist.”); Jamal Greene, Heller High Water? The Future of Originalism, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 325,
342 (2009) (“Justice Kennedy . . . has never been an originalist and disagrees with Justice Scalia as often as not
in divided cases.”); Steven G. Calabresi, Substantive Due Process After Gonzales v. Carhart, 106 MICH. L. REV.
1517, 1531 (2008) (“Kennedy is thus a Burkean, not an originalist.”).
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Second, scholars and commentators often describe Justice Kennedy as the
4
“swing vote” on the Supreme Court. According to this view, the Court has two
blocks of four justices who commonly vote together in constitutional cases. One
block includes Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Scalia, Justice Thomas, and Justice
Alito. The other block includes Justice Breyer, Justice Ginsburg, Justice
Sotomayor, and Justice Kagan. As the swing vote, Justice Kennedy belongs to
neither block, but “swings” between them, ultimately deciding which group will
write the majority opinion in many cases. If this characterization is accurate, then
knowing the kinds of arguments that might persuade Justice Kennedy may be key
for litigants to win their cases. Among other things that may be central to
winning Justice Kennedy’s vote in constitutional cases may be understanding the
extent to which Justice Kennedy relies on sources of the original meaning of the
Constitution.
Third, over the past twenty-five years, the Supreme Court has cited sources
of the original meaning of the Constitution more frequently than in any
5
comparable period. Numerous important decisions, like United States Term
6
Limits v. Thornton, have involved disputes between the majority and dissent
about the original meaning of constitutional provisions. In assessing Justice
Kennedy’s record over the past twenty-five years, a significant question is to
what extent Justice Kennedy has contributed to the Supreme Court’s originalist
jurisprudence.
Beyond describing my observations with respect to how Justice Kennedy
uses sources of the original meaning of the Constitution and arguing about why
these observations may be important, I do not offer a normative assessment of
Justice Kennedy’s decision-making. The extent to which judges must follow the
original meaning of the Constitution is an important and controversial issue, but
this issue exceeds the scope of this Article. Many other works address this
7
question in great detail. The normative question is distinct and should not affect
inquiries into whether Justice Kennedy is or is not an originalist, about what

4. See Adam Liptak, The Roberts Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 2010, at A1.
5. See Justice Antonin Scalia, Foreword to STEVEN G. CALABRESI, ORIGINALISM: A QUARTERCENTURY OF DEBATE 44–45 (2007) (discussing the non-existence of “originalists” on law-school faculties
twenty years ago and that Supreme Court opinions will expose the upcoming generation of lawyers to
originalists’ thinking); Rebecca E. Zietlow, Popular Originalism? The Tea Party Movement and Constitutional
Theory, 64 FLA. L. REV. 483, 491 (2012).
6. 514 U.S. 779 (1995).
7. For well-known writings arguing that judges should follow the original meaning of the Constitution,
see RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1977); ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE
POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW (1990); Lino A. Graglia, Constitutional Interpretation, 44 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 631 (1993); Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849 (1989). For the opposite
view, see Boris I. Bittker, The Bicentennial of the Jurisprudence of Original Intent: The Recent Past, 77 CALIF.
L. REV. 235 (1989); H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885
(1985).
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kinds of arguments influence Justice Kennedy, or the extent to which Justice
Kennedy has contributed to the Supreme Court’s originalist jurisprudence.
III. DESCRIPTION OF THE CASES
What follows is a description of the Supreme Court cases in which Justice
Kennedy has written opinions—including majority opinions, concurring
opinions, and dissents—that cite sources of the original meaning of the
Constitution. The following description does not include opinions written by
other members of the Court, even if Justice Kennedy joined those opinions. In
conducting research for this Article, I looked for instances in which Justice
Kennedy referred to the Federalist Papers, the records of the Federal
Constitutional Convention, the records of the state ratifying conventions, the acts
of the First Congress, and dictionaries from the founding period. The Supreme
Court commonly cites these sources in support of claims about the original
meaning of the Constitution. I limited my inquiry to these five sources solely to
make the research more manageable. To be sure, other vital sources exist that
address the original meaning of constitutional amendments. Yet, because these
five sources are the most frequently cited sources of the original meaning, I have
assumed that looking for citations of these sources will provide a sufficient
sample for making generalizations about Justice Kennedy’s use of all sources of
the original meaning.
A. The Federalist Papers
In 1787 and 1788, Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay wrote
a total of eighty-five essays urging the state of New York to ratify the
8
Constitution. Courts have cited these essays as evidence of the original meaning
9
of the Constitution in more than 1,700 cases. Although claims made about the
original meaning based on the Federalist Papers are subject to challenges on
various grounds, the Federalist Papers are a popular source because they are
easily accessible and systematically address nearly every aspect of the
Constitution.
Justice Kennedy has cited the Federalist Papers in twenty-one of his
10
11
opinions. In two of these cases, Missouri v. Jenkins and Public Citizen v.

8. See Gregory E. Maggs, A Concise Guide to the Federalist Papers as a Source of the Original
Meaning of the United States Constitution, 87 B.U. L. REV. 801, 802 (2007).
9. See id.
10. I did not count two cases, Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460 (2005) and Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene
Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261 (1997). In both of these cases, Justice Kennedy cited other decisions and merely
noted in a parenthetical phrase following the citations that these other cases had relied on the Federalist papers.
In Granholm, Justice Kennedy cited C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 390 (1994). 544 U.S. at
472–73. In Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe, Justice Kennedy cited Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S.
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United States Department of Justice, Justice Kennedy relied greatly on the
Federalist Papers in reaching his conclusion on the specific issues before the
Court. In Missouri v. Jenkins, the Supreme Court invalidated a federal district
court order that had increased property taxes within a school district to pay for
13
the desegregation of the district’s schools. Justice Kennedy wrote an opinion
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which he concluded that
14
federal courts cannot issue remedial orders imposing taxes. He based this
conclusion both on the text of Article III of the Constitution and on what the
15
Federalist Papers said about judicial power. Justice Kennedy wrote:
The description of the judicial power nowhere includes the word “tax” or
anything that resembles it. This reflects the Framers’ understanding that
taxation was not a proper area for judicial involvement. “The
judiciary . . . has no influence over either the sword or the purse, no
direction either of the strength or of the wealth of the society, and can
take no active resolution whatever.” The Federalist No. 78, p. 523 (J.
16
Cooke ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton).
17

In Public Citizen v. United States Department of Justice, the Supreme Court
held that as a matter of statutory interpretation, the Federal Advisory Committee
18
Act (FACA) did not apply to the American Bar Association (ABA) when the
19
ABA provided advice to the Justice Department on federal judicial nominees.
20
Justice Kennedy wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment. He concluded
that, as a matter of statutory interpretation, the FACA would apply to the ABA,
but he concluded that such application would violate the Appointments Clause in
21
Article II. Justice Kennedy began by asserting that “[t]he Framers of our
Government knew that the most precious of liberties could remain secure only if
they created a structure of Government based on a permanent separation of
22
powers. See, e.g., The Federalist Nos. 47–51 (J. Madison).” He then cited the
313, 322–23 (1934). 521 U.S. at 267.
11. 495 U.S. 33 (1990).
12. 491 U.S. 440 (1989).
13. 495 U.S. at 57–58.
14. Id. at 58–82 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
15. Id.
16. Id. at 65 (omission in original).
17. 491 U.S. 440.
18. Pub. L. No 92–463, 86 Stat. 770 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. App. §§ 1–15 (1984)).
19. 491 U.S. at 443.
20. Id. at 467 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
21. Id. at 482. The Appointments Clause says that the President “by and with the Advice and Consent of
the Senate, shall appoint . . . Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose
Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law . . . .” U.S. CONST.
art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
22. Public Citizen, 491 U.S. at 468 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
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Federalist Papers again to explain his concern about using the majority’s
reasoning to resolve the case:
I believe the Court’s loose invocation of the “absurd result” canon of
statutory construction creates too great a risk that the Court is exercising
its own “WILL instead of JUDGMENT,” with the consequence of
“substituti[ng] [its own] pleasure to that of the legislative body.” The
23
Federalist No. 78, p. 469 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton).
Turning to the constitutional issue, Justice Kennedy relied heavily on what the
24
Federalist Papers said about presidential appointments. Justice Kennedy wrote:
“No role whatsoever is given either to the Senate or to Congress as a whole in the
25
process of choosing the person who will be nominated for appointment.” He
then quoted three specific statements by Hamilton in the Federalist Papers
26
supporting the view that the President alone would choose nominees. These
quotations weighed heavily in Justice Kennedy’s decision that applying the
FACA to the ABA when the ABA provides advice on nominees would violate
27
the Appointments Clause.
In the other nineteen cases in which Justice Kennedy cited the Federalist
Papers, he did not rely directly on them in deciding the issues before the Court.
Instead, Justice Kennedy cited the Federalist Papers to confirm generally
accepted background principles about the nature of the United States government
and about the concerns of the Framers. Explication of these background issues
helps to introduce the questions about which Justice Kennedy was writing but did
not decide the questions. With the hope that I do not overwhelm anyone reading
this Article with detail, I include here a brief description of each of these
additional nineteen cases and quote what Justice Kennedy said about the
Federalist Papers. I feel this is the best way to convey the difference between

23. Id. at 471 (alterations in original).
24. Id. at 482–83.
25. Id. at 483.
26. Id. The first quotation said: “‘In the act of nomination, [the President’s] judgment alone would be
exercised; and as it would be his sole duty to point out the man who, with the approbation of the Senate, should
fill an office, his responsibility would be as complete as if he were to make the final appointment.’ The
Federalist No. 76, 456–457 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (emphasis added).” Id. The second quotation said: “‘It will be
the office of the President to nominate, and, with the advice and consent of the Senate, to appoint. There will, of
course, be no exertion of choice on the part of the Senate. They may defeat one choice of the Executive, and
oblige him to make another; but they cannot themselves choose-they can only ratify or reject the choice he may
have made.’ Id., No. 66, at 405 (emphasis in original).” Id. The third quotation said: “‘The sole and undivided
responsibility of one man will naturally beget a livelier sense of duty and a more exact regard to reputation. He
will, on this account, feel himself under stronger obligations, and more interested to investigate with care the
qualities requisite to the stations to be filled, and to prefer with impartiality the persons who may have the
fairest pretensions to them.’ The Federalist No. 76, at 455–456.” Id. at 483 n.4.
27. See id.at 488–89.
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these cases and Missouri v. Jenkins and Public Citizen v. United States
29
Department of Justice.
(1) In Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, the Supreme Court
considered the constitutionality of a federal campaign finance law that, among
30
other things, attempted to limit corporate financing of elections. In his opinion
for the Court, Justice Kennedy wrote about the problem of political power and
31
whether limiting the speech of corporations was a proper remedy. He said:
Factions will necessarily form in our Republic, but the remedy of
“destroying the liberty” of some factions is “worse than the disease.” The
Federalist No. 10, p. 130 (B. Wright ed. 1961) (J. Madison). Factions
should be checked by permitting them all to speak, see ibid., and by
32
entrusting the people to judge what is true and what is false.
Justice Kennedy does not interpret the First Amendment in this passage, but sets
the context for his opinion in the case by explaining James Madison’s
33
understanding of the power of political parties and support for free speech.
(2) In Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., the Supreme Court held that a state
supreme court justice should have recused himself under the circumstances of the
34
particular case. Justice Kennedy began his opinion for the Court by discussing
35
the leading precedent of Tumey v. Ohio, writing: “The Tumey Court concluded
that the Due Process Clause incorporated the common-law rule that a judge must
recuse himself when he has ‘a direct, personal, substantial, pecuniary interest’ in
36
a case.” Immediately after this sentence, Justice Kennedy explained: “This rule
reflects the maxim that ‘[n]o man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause;
because his interest would certainly bias his judgment, and, not improbably,
corrupt his integrity.’ The Federalist No. 10, p. 59 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (J.
37
Madison).” Again, Justice Kennedy is not using the Federalist Papers to decide
the issue in the case, but instead to frame the issue with an accepted basic
38
principle.

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

495 U.S. 33 (1990).
491 U.S. 440.
130 S. Ct. 876, 886 (2010).
Id. at 907.
Id.
See id.
556 U.S. 868, 872 (2009).
273 U.S. 510 (1927).
Caperton, 556 U.S. at 876.
Id. (alteration in original).
See id.
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(3) In Boumediene v. Bush, the Supreme Court considered the
40
constitutionality of a provision of the Military Commissions Act of 2006 that
sought to prevent federal courts from exercising jurisdiction over habeas corpus
petitions filed by suspected enemy belligerents confined at the U.S. Navy Base in
41
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Justice Kennedy provided considerable background
42
about the writ of habeas corpus in his opinion. Justice Kennedy noted,
“Alexander Hamilton [like others] explained that by providing the detainee a
judicial forum to challenge detention, the writ [of habeas corpus] preserves
43
limited government.” Justice Kennedy then quoted at length from Federalist No.
44
84, written by Alexander Hamilton, supporting this proposition. Rather than
deciding the particular issue before the Court, citing Hamilton’s statements in
Federalist No. 84 supported a general proposition about the purpose of writs of
45
habeas corpus.
(4) In Department of Revenue of Kentucky v. Davis, the Supreme Court
upheld a Kentucky income tax law that exempted interest on bonds issued by the
Kentucky government and its subdivisions, but did not exempt interest on bonds
46
issued by other states. The Court ruled that the difference in treatment did not
47
violate the Dormant Commerce Clause. Justice Kennedy dissented, stating:
The object of creating free trade throughout a single nation, without
protectionist state laws, was a dominant theme of the convention at
Philadelphia and during the ratification debates that followed. See, e.g.,
The Federalist No. 22, pp. 143–144 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton)
(“It is indeed evident, on the most superficial view, that there is no

39. 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
40. Pub. L. No. 109–366, 120 Stat. 2600 (codified as amended in scattered sections of Titles 10, 18, and
42 of the United States Code).
41. 553 U.S. at 732.
42. See id. at 739–52.
43. Id. at 744.
44. Id. The passage that Justice Kennedy cited said:
[T]he practice of arbitrary imprisonments, have been, in all ages, the favorite and most formidable
instruments of tyranny. The observations of the judicious Blackstone . . . are well worthy of recital:
“To bereave a man of life . . . or by violence to confiscate his estate, without accusation or trial,
would be so gross and notorious an act of despotism as must at once convey the alarm of tyranny
throughout the whole nation; but confinement of the person, by secretly hurrying him to jail, where
his sufferings are unknown or forgotten, is a less public, a less striking, and therefore a more
dangerous engine of arbitrary government.” And as a remedy for this fatal evil he is everywhere
peculiarly emphatical in his encomiums on the habeas corpus act, which in one place he calls “the
BULWARK of the British Constitution.” C. Rossiter ed., p. 512 (1961) (quoting 1 Blackstone *136,
4 id., at *438).
Id. (alterations and omissions in original).
45. See id.
46. 553 U.S. 328 (2008).
47. Id. at 332.
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object, either as it respects the interest of trade or finance, that more
48
strongly demands a federal superintendence.”)
As in the previous examples, the quotation from the Federalist Papers is
important in establishing context, and confirms a general proposition that is
49
largely uncontroversial: the Framers supported free-trade among the states. The
50
quotation was not intended to resolve the specific issue under consideration.
(5) In Roper v. Simmons, the Supreme Court held that the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments prohibit imposing capital punishment on individuals
who were under eighteen years of age at the time they committed their capital
51
crimes. Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy made the following general
statement about how Americans view the Constitution: “Over time, from one
generation to the next, the Constitution has come to earn the high respect and
even, as Madison dared to hope, the veneration of the American people. See The
52
Federalist No. 49, p. 314 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).” This statement merely
established background and was not used to resolve the specific issue before the
53
Court.
(6) In United States v. Locke, the Court held that a federal statute governing
ports and waterways preempted a Washington State law that attempted to
54
55
regulate oil tankers. Justice Kennedy wrote the majority opinion in this case. In
discussing the state legislation, Justice Kennedy made the following general
remarks:
The State of Washington has enacted legislation in an area where the
federal interest has been manifest since the beginning of our Republic
and is now well established. The authority of Congress to regulate
interstate navigation, without embarrassment from intervention of the
separate States and resulting difficulties with foreign nations, was cited
in the Federalist Papers as one of the reasons for adopting the
56
Constitution. E.g., The Federalist Nos. 44, 12, 64.

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id. at 364 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
See id.
See id.
543 U.S. 551, 574 (2005).
Id. at 578.
See id.
529 U.S. 89 (2000).
Id. at 94.
Id. at 99.
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57

This general principle did not resolve the issue before the Court.
58
(7) In Alden v. Maine, state probation officers sued the State of Maine in
59
state court to recover overtime pay under the Fair Labor Standards Act. The
Court held that Congress could not subject Maine to liability for damages in a
60
state court without the consent of the state. Justice Kennedy, writing for the
majority, cited the Federalist Papers three times in a passage outlining the nature
61
and importance of state sovereignty under the Constitution. First, Justice
Kennedy reminded readers that “[t]he States ‘form distinct and independent
portions of the supremacy, no more subject, within their respective spheres, to
the general authority than the general authority is subject to them, within its own
62
sphere.’ The Federalist No. 39, p. 245 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (J. Madison).”
Second, Justice Kennedy observed that in creating a federal government that
could regulate individuals directly (and not through the states),
the Founders achieved a deliberate departure from the Articles of
Confederation: Experience under the Articles had “exploded on all
hands” the “practicality of making laws, with coercive sanctions, for the
States as political bodies.” 2 Records of the Federal Convention of 1787,
p. 9 (M. Farrand ed. 1911) (J. Madison); accord, The Federalist No. 20,
63
at 138 (J. Madison and A. Hamilton).
Third, in his final reference to the Federalist Papers, Justice Kennedy concluded:
“The States thus retain ‘a residuary and inviolable sovereignty.’ The Federalist
No. 39, at 245. They are not relegated to the role of mere provinces or political
corporations, but retain the dignity, though not the full authority, of
64
sovereignty.” These general propositions framed the issue before the Court, but
65
were not sufficient to decide the issue before the Court. As discussed below,
however, Justice Kennedy made much more specific use of the statements made
by James Madison and John Marshall at the Virginia ratifying convention in
66
deciding the issue before the Court.
67
(8) In City of Boerne v. Flores, the Supreme Court held that the Religious
68
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 exceeded Congress’s power under Section 5
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

86

See id.
527 U.S. 706 (1999).
Id.; Ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1060 (1938) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–62 (1994)).
See Alden, 527 U.S. at 712.
Id. at 714–15.
Id. at 714.
Id.
Id. at 715.
See id.
See infra Part III.A.
521 U.S. 507 (1997).
Pub. L. No. 103–41, 107 Stat. 1488, invalidated by, City of Boerne, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (codified at
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of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act sought
to prohibit state governments from “substantially burden[ing]” an exercise of
religion, even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability unless the
government can demonstrate the burden: “(1) is in furtherance of a compelling
governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that . . .
70
interest.” Justice Kennedy began his constitutional analysis by stating: “Under
our Constitution, the Federal Government is one of enumerated powers.
McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 405 (1819); see also The Federalist No.
71
45, p. 292 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (J. Madison).” Again, this is an important
background principle, but it was not cited for the purpose of directly resolving
72
the issue before the Court.
(9) In Loving v. United States, the Supreme Court upheld the system for
73
adjudging death sentences in the military courts. At issue was whether it was
proper for the President, rather than Congress, to promulgate the list of
aggravating factors for courts-martial to consider when sentencing service
74
members convicted of capital offenses. In the majority opinion, Justice Kennedy
wrote:
Though faithful to the precept that freedom is imperiled if the whole of
legislative, executive, and judicial power is in the same hands, The
Federalist No. 47, pp. 325–326 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961), the
Framers understood that a “hermetic sealing off of the three branches of
Government from one another would preclude the establishment of a
Nation capable of governing itself effectively,” Buckley v. Valeo, 424
75
U.S. 1, 120–121 (1976) (per curiam).
As in the previously discussed cases, the basic principle cited was not in
76
77
dispute. The citation provided only background.
(10) In C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, the Supreme Court held
that a town’s ordinance discriminating against non-local waste processors

42 U.S.C. § 2000bb4 (2006)).
69. Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment empowers Congress to enforce the guarantees of section 1
of the Fourteenth Amendment, which includes that guarantee of Due Process. See U.S. CONST. amend. 14, §§ 1,
14.
70. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2006).
71. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 516.
72. See id.
73. 517 U.S. 748, 759 (1996).
74. See id. at 759.
75. Id. at 756. The Court also cited Mistretta v. United States, and noted parenthetically that it had
quoted The Federalist No. 47. Id. at 757 (citing 488 U.S. 361, 380–81 (1989)).
76. See Loving, 517 U.S. at 756.
77. See id.
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violated the Dormant Commerce Clause. Justice Kennedy explained the
Dormant Commerce Clause by articulating this well-accepted principle:
The central rationale for the rule against discrimination is to prohibit
state or municipal laws whose object is local economic protectionism,
laws that would excite those jealousies and retaliatory measures the
Constitution was designed to prevent. See The Federalist No. 22, pp.
79
143–145 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton).
(11) In Clinton v. City of New York, the Supreme Court invalidated a federal
act that would have given the President a “line-item veto,” allowing the President
80
to veto spending provisions and tax breaks in legislation. In his concurring
opinion, Justice Kennedy cited the Federalist Papers in two nearby passages, first
stating:
Separation of powers was designed to implement a fundamental
insight: Concentration of power in the hands of a single branch is a threat
to liberty. The Federalist states the axiom in these explicit terms: “The
accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the
same hands . . . may justly be pronounced the very definition of
tyranny.” The Federalist No. 47, p. 301 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). So
convinced were the Framers that liberty of the person inheres in structure
that at first they did not consider a Bill of Rights necessary. The
81
Federalist No. 84, pp. 513, 515.
Justice Kennedy then added:
In this vision, liberty demands limits on the ability of any one branch to
influence basic political decisions. Quoting Montesquieu, the Federalist
Papers made the point in the following manner:
“‘When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same
person or body,’ says he, ‘there can be no liberty, because apprehensions
may arise lest the same monarch or senate should enact tyrannical laws
to execute them in a tyrannical manner.’ Again: ‘Were the power of
judging joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of the subject

78. 511 U.S. 383, 386 (1994). The Dormant Commerce Clause precludes states from discriminating
against interstate commerce, from enacting laws on subjects where a uniform national standard is necessary, or
from imposing an excessive burden on interstate commerce, even if Congress has not legislated in the area. See,
e.g., CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69, 87–90 (1987) (considering each of these bases for
invalidating a state law).
79. C & A Carbone, Inc., 511 U.S. at 390.
80. 524 U.S. 417, 436 (1998).
81. Id. at 450 (omissions in original).
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would be exposed to arbitrary control, for the judge would then be the
legislator. Were it joined to the executive power, the judge might behave
with all the violence of an oppressor.’” The Federalist No. 47, supra, at
82
303.
The aim of this extended passage was to frame the issue before the Court and not
83
to decide the issue.
84
(12) In Crawford-El v. Britton, the Supreme Court held that a state prison
inmate need not present clear and convincing evidence of improper motive to
withstand a summary judgment motion, in an action against state prison officials
85
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Justice Kennedy’s concurrence stated: “We must guard
against disdain for the judicial system. As Madison reminds us, if the
Constitution is to endure, it must from age to age retain ‘th[e] veneration which
time bestows.’ James Madison, The Federalist No. 49, p. 314 (C. Rossiter ed.
86
1961).” Justice Kennedy made this important point only to establish background
87
for deciding the issue in the case.
(13) In United States Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, the Supreme Court
struck down a state law that effectively would have imposed term limits on
members of the House of Representatives and Senate by restricting access to the
88
ballot after successive terms of office. In his concurring opinion, Justice
Kennedy noted:
A distinctive character of the National Government, the mark of its
legitimacy, is that it owes its existence to the act of the whole people
who created it. It must be remembered that the National Government,
too, is republican in essence and in theory. John Jay insisted on this point
early in The Federalist Papers, in his comments on the government that
89
preceded the one formed by the Constitution.

82. Id. at 450–51 (emphasis in original).
83. See id.
84. 523 U.S. 574 (1998).
85. See id. at 594. The statute in question, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, creates a federal civil cause of action
against state officials who violate the Constitution, stating:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State
or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at
law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
86. Crawford-El, 523 U.S. at 601 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (alteration in original).
87. See id.
88. 514 U.S. 779, 783 (1995).
89. Id. at 839 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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After quoting at length from The Federalist No. 2, Justice Kennedy immediately
wrote:
Once the National Government was formed under our Constitution, the
same republican principles continued to guide its operation and practice.
As James Madison explained, the House of Representatives “derive[s] its
powers from the people of America,” and “the operation of the
government on the people in their individual capacities” makes it “a
national government,” not merely a federal one. Id., No. 39, at 244, 245
91
(emphasis deleted).
Further into the opinion, Justice Kennedy added: “Of course, because the
Framers recognized that state power and identity were essential parts of the
federal balance, see The Federalist No. 39, the Constitution is solicitous of the
92
prerogatives of the States, even in an otherwise sovereign federal province.”
These references to the Federalist Papers confirmed important background
principles for understanding what was at stake in the case, but they did not
resolve the issue of whether the qualifications for office stated in the Constitution
were the minimum qualifications or both the minimum and maximum
93
qualifications.
94
(14) In United States v. Lopez, the Supreme Court held that Congress lacked
95
power under the Commerce Clause to enact the Gun-Free School Zones Act of
96
1990, which made it a federal crime for any person knowingly to possess a
firearm at a place that the person knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, is a
97
school zone. The case was significant because it was the first decision in sixty
98
years holding that Congress lacked power to pass a law. In a concurring
opinion, Justice Kennedy cited the Federalist Papers in addressing basic
principles of federalism:

90. Id. The quotation was: “‘To all general purposes we have uniformly been one people; each
individual citizen everywhere enjoying the same national rights, privileges, and protection. . . . A strong sense
of the value and blessings of union induced the people, at a very early period, to institute a federal government
to preserve and perpetuate it. They formed it almost as soon as they had a political existence. . . .’ The Federalist
No. 2, pp. 38–39 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (hereinafter The Federalist).” Id. (omissions in original).
91. Id. (alteration in original).
92. Id. at 841.
93. See id. at 839–41.
94. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
95. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
96. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A) (2006).
97. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551.
98. The previous case was A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, in which the Supreme Court
struck down regulations concerning the hours and wages of persons employed in intrastate businesses. 295 U.S.
495, 550 (1935).

90

04_MAGGS_VER_01_5-18-12_FINAL.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)

7/22/2013 2:33 PM

McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 44
The theory that two governments accord more liberty than one
requires for its realization two distinct and discernible lines of political
accountability: one between the citizens and the Federal Government; the
second between the citizens and the States. If, as Madison expected, the
Federal and State Governments are to control each other, see The
Federalist No. 51, and hold each other in check by competing for the
affections of the people, see The Federalist No. 46, those citizens must
have some means of knowing which of the two governments to hold
accountable for the failure to perform a given function. . . .
To be sure, one conclusion that could be drawn from The Federalist
Papers is that the balance between national and state power is entrusted
in its entirety to the political process. Madison’s observation that “the
people ought not surely to be precluded from giving most of their
confidence where they may discover it to be most due,” The Federalist
No. 46, p. 295 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961), can be interpreted to say that the
essence of responsibility for a shift in power from the State to the Federal
Government rests upon a political judgment, though he added assurance
that “the State governments could have little to apprehend, because it is
only within a certain sphere that the federal power can, in the nature of
things, be advantageously administered,” ibid. Whatever the judicial role,
it is axiomatic that Congress does have substantial discretion and control
99
over the federal balance.
Again in this instance, Justice Kennedy relied on the Federalist Papers in
100
explicating background principles that framed the issue in the case. But the
Federalist Papers were not used to resolve the specific question of whether
bringing guns into the schools was a matter that Congress could regulate under
101
its Commerce Power.
(15) In American Dredging Co. v. Miller, the Supreme Court held that
federal admiralty law does not preempt state law forum non conveniens
102
principles in cases filed in state court. Justice Kennedy wrote a dissenting
opinion in which he said:
At the time of the framing, it was essential that our prospective foreign
trading partners know that the United States would uphold its treaties,
respect the general maritime law, and refrain from erecting barriers to
commerce. The individual States needed similar assurances from each
other. See The Federalist No. 22, pp. 143–145 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961)
99.
100.
101.
102.

Lopez, 514 U.S. at 576–77 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
See id.
See id.
510 U.S. 443, 457 (1994).
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(Hamilton). Federal admiralty and maritime jurisdiction was the solution.
103
See The Federalist No. 80, supra, at 478 (Hamilton).
This statement explicates the purposes of federal admiralty jurisdiction; Justice
Kennedy did not cite the Federalist Papers to resolve the preemption issue before
104
the Court.
105
106
(16) In Dennis v. Higgins, the Supreme Court held that 42 U.S.C. § 1983
provided a cause of action against state officials for violating the Dormant
107
Commerce Clause. Justice Kennedy wrote a dissenting opinion in which he
cited the Federalist Papers to establish a general and uncontroverted principle
regarding a defect in the Articles of Confederation:
The lack of a national power over commerce during the Articles of
Confederation led to ongoing disputes among the States, and the prospect
of a descent toward even more intense commercial animosity was one of
the principal arguments in favor of the Constitution. See, e.g., The
Federalist No. 7, pp. 62–63 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton); id., No.
11, pp. 89–90 (A. Hamilton); id., No. 22, pp. 143–145 (A. Hamilton); id.,
108
No. 42, pp. 267–269 (J. Madison); id., No. 53, p. 333 (J. Madison).
109

(17) In Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, the Supreme Court held that a
federal civil rights statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, which prohibits racial
110
discrimination in the making and enforcement of private contracts, did not
111
address racial harassment in the course of employment. Writing for the
majority, Justice Kennedy addressed the principle of stare decisis:
Although we have cautioned that “stare decisis is a principle of policy
and not a mechanical formula of adherence to the latest decision,” Boys
Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks, 398 U.S. 235, 241 (1970), it is
indisputable that stare decisis is a basic self-governing principle within
the Judicial Branch, which is entrusted with the sensitive and difficult
task of fashioning and preserving a jurisprudential system that is not
103. Id. at 466 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
104. See id.
105. 498 U.S. 439 (1991).
106. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006); see also supra note 85 and accompanying text (providing the text of 42
U.S.C. § 1983).
107. Dennis, 498 U.S. 439. For a description of the Dormant Commerce Clause, see supra note 78 and
accompanying text.
108. Dennis, 498 U.S. at 453 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
109. 491 U.S. 164 (1989).
110. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 provides: “All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the
same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens . . . .”
42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2006).
111. Patterson, 491 U.S. at 176.

92

04_MAGGS_VER_01_5-18-12_FINAL.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)

7/22/2013 2:33 PM

McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 44
based upon “an arbitrary discretion.” The Federalist, No. 78, p. 490 (H.
112
Lodge ed. 1888) (A. Hamilton).
Again, Justice Kennedy used the Federalist Papers to establish general principles
113
rather than to decide a particular issue.
(18) In Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, the Supreme Court
upheld a state statute prohibiting corporations from making independent
114
expenditures to support or oppose election candidates. Justice Kennedy filed a
dissenting opinion in which he said: “It is a distinctive part of the American
character for individuals to join associations to enrich the public dialogue. The
theme of group identity is part of the history of American democracy. See, e.g.,
115
The Federalist No. 10 (J. Madison).” This statement provided a general
background for Justice Kennedy’s interpretation of the First Amendment, but
116
was not decisive in his resolution of the issue in the case.
(19) In City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., the Court struck down a city
plan requiring general contractors who were awarded city construction contracts
117
to use “minority business enterprises” for thirty percent of their subcontracts.
The Court held that the plan violated the Equal Protection Clause because the
118
city did not have a compelling justification for favoring minority businesses. In
an opinion concurring in the judgment, Justice Kennedy wrote: “An acute
awareness of the heightened danger of oppression from political factions in
small, rather than large, political units dates to the very beginning of our national
119
history.” He then quoted, at length, remarks by James Madison in the Federalist
120
Papers about parties and factions. As in the other eighteen cases described

112. Id. at 172.
113. See id.
114. 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
115. Id. at 710 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
116. See id.
117. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
118. See id. at 505.
119. Id. at 523 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
120. Id. The quotation was:
“The smaller the society, the fewer probably will be the distinct parties and interests composing
it; the fewer the distinct parties and interests, the more frequently will a majority be found of the
same party; and the smaller the number of individuals composing a majority, and the smaller the
compass within which they are placed, the more easily will they concert and execute their plan of
oppression. Extend the sphere and you take in a greater variety of parties and interests; you make it
less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other
citizens; or if such a common motive exists, it will be more difficult for all who feel it to discover
their own strength and to act in unison with each other.” The Federalist No. 10, pp. 82–84 (C.
Rossiter ed. 1961).
Id.
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above, this statement helped to frame but was not intended to decide the issue
121
before the Court.
B. Records of the Federal Constitutional Convention
The Founders drafted the Constitution at the Federal Constitutional
122
Convention held in Philadelphia during the summer of 1787. An appointed
secretary kept an official journal of the convention proceedings, while James
Madison, and at least eight others, kept notes about what was said and done at the
123
124
Convention. Madison’s notes were published in 1840. Half a century later,
Professor Max Farrand gathered and chronologically organized both Madison’s
notes and all of the other known records in his classic work, The Records of the
125
Federal Convention of 1787. Courts have relied on these records in hundreds of
cases.
Justice Kennedy has cited the records of the Constitutional Convention in
126
two of his opinions. In one of these cases, United States v. International
127
128
Business Machines Corp., the Supreme Court held that the Export Clause
prohibited imposing a generally applicable, nondiscriminatory federal tax on
129
insurance premiums for insurance policies covering exported goods. In a
dissenting opinion, Justice Kennedy asserted that the Framers understood the
Export Clause to prohibit only taxes on exports, and not taxes on insurance
130
covering exported goods. In reaching this conclusion, Justice Kennedy
emphasized that “specific taxes on exported goods were the only taxes mentioned
131
in the debate at the Constitutional Convention over the Export Clause.” To
support this proposition, he cited numerous, specific statements made at the
132
Convention about the Export Clause. In this instance, Justice Kennedy relied
121. See id.
122. See 1 JOHN R. VILE, THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1787: A COMPREHENSIVE
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICA’S FOUNDING 33–34 (2005).
123. See id. at 665–66.
124. See id. at 666.
125. See THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 (Max Farrand ed., 1911).
126. My search of WestLaw’s ALLCASES database for “Farrand w/10 records” yielded 304 cases.
127. 517 U.S. 843 (1996).
128. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 5. The Export Clause states: “No Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles
exported from any State.” Id.
129. See Int’l Bus. Machines Corp., 517 U.S. at 845.
130. Id. at 873 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
131. Id.
132. Justice Kennedy wrote:
For example, Gouverneur Morris of Pennsylvania, opposing the Clause, favored taxing exports as an
alternative to direct taxes on individuals.
“He considered the taxing of exports to be in many cases highly politic. Virginia has found her
account in taxing Tobacco. All Countries having peculiar articles tax the exportation of them; as
France her wines and brandies. A tax here on lumber, would fall on the W. Indies & punish their
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directly on what was said at the Convention in his reasoning about the specific
133
issue before the Court.
134
135
In the other case, Alden v. Maine, discussed above, Justice Kennedy
observed that the Constitution differs from the Articles of Confederation in that it
136
empowers the national government to regulate individuals. He wrote (as also
137
quoted above) :
In this the Founders achieved a deliberate departure from the Articles of
Confederation: Experience under the Articles had “exploded on all
hands” the “practicality of making laws, with coercive sanctions, for the
States as political bodies.” 2 Records of the Federal Convention of 1787,
138
p. 9 (M. Farrand ed. 1911) (J. Madison).
Here Justice Kennedy used the Records of the Federal Constitutional Convention
for background and framing purposes, but not to resolve the specific issue before
139
the Court.

restrictions on our trade. The same is true of live-stock and in some degree of flour. In case of a
dearth in the West Indies, we may extort what we please. Taxes on exports are a necessary source of
revenue. For a long time the people of America will not have money to pay direct taxes. Seize and
sell their effects and you push them into Revolts.” 2 Max Farrand, Records of the Federal
Convention of 1787, p. 307 (rev. ed. 1966).
See also id., at 306 (Mr. Madison: taxes on exported goods, like tobacco, in which Americans were
unrivalled would shift the tax burden to foreigners); id., at 360 (Gouverneur Morris: taxes on goods
are essential to embargoes, while taxes on ginseng and ship masts would shift the tax burden abroad,
and taxes on skins, beavers, and other raw materials might encourage American manufactures); id.,
at 361 (Mr. Dickenson [sic]: suggesting exemption of certain articles from the Export Clause); id., at
362 (Mr. Fitzimmons: discussing duties imposed on wool by Great Britain). Proponents of the
Export Clause also focused on taxes on goods. Id., at 307 (Mr. Mercer: a tax on exported goods
encourages the raising of articles not meant for exportation); id., at 360 (Mr. Williamson: discussing
taxation of North Carolina tobacco by Virginia); id., at 361 (Mr. Sherman: general prohibition on
power to tax exports necessary because “[a]n enumeration of particular articles would be difficult
invidious and improper”); id., at 363 (Colonel Mason: discussing Virginia tax on tobacco; Mr.
Clymer: discussing middle States’ apprehensions of taxes on products like wheat flour and
provisions that, unlike tobacco and rice, were sold in competitive markets). Oliver Ellsworth of
Connecticut even contended that he opposed export taxes in part because “there are indeed but a few
articles that could be taxed at all; as Tobo. rice & indigo, and a tax on these alone would be partial &
unjust.” Id., at 360.
Id. at 873–74 (quoting 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 306–07, 360–63 (Max
Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966)).
133. See id.
134. 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
135. See supra Part III.A.(7).
136. See 527 U.S. at 714 (citing 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 9 (Max
Farrand ed., 1911)).
137. See supra Part III.A.(9).
138. Alden, 527 U.S. at 714.
139. See id.; supra Part III.A.(1)–(19).
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C. Records of the State Ratifying Conventions
By its terms, the Constitution could not go into effect until it was ratified by
140
nine states in ratifying conventions. Some records of these debates were made
141
and preserved. Courts often cite these debates as evidence of the original
142
meaning of the Constitution. I could find, however, only one reference to these
143
144
debates by Justice Kennedy. In Alden v. Maine, discussed above, the Court
held that state sovereign immunity prevented a government employee from
145
recovering damages from the state under the Federal Fair Labor Standards Act.
In writing the majority opinion, Justice Kennedy relied heavily on statements that
146
James Madison and John Marshall made at the Virginia ratifying convention.
Justice Kennedy cited Madison’s statement that “[i]t is not in the power of
individuals to call any state into court” and Marshall’s statement that “I hope no
147
gentleman will think that a state will be called at the bar of a federal court.” In
this instance, unlike in most of the cases previously discussed, Justice Kennedy is
using a source of the original meaning of the Constitution to resolve a specific
148
issue, rather than merely to establish background principles.
D. Acts of the First Congress
After ratification of the Constitution in the state ratifying conventions, the
149
First Congress under the Constitution met from March 1789 to March 1791. In
the First Congress, a total of twenty-nine persons served as senators, and sixty150
six served as representatives. Many of these senators and representatives
justifiably could consider themselves experts on the Constitution. Ten of the

140. See U.S. CONST. art. VII (“The Ratification of the Conventions of nine States, shall be sufficient for
the Establishment of this Constitution between the States so ratifying the Same.”).
141. See Gregory E. Maggs, A Concise Guide to The Records of the State Ratifying Conventions as a
Source of the Original Meaning of the U.S. Constitution, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 457, 466–81 (2009) (describing
the known records).
142. See id. at 458.
143. 527 U.S. 706.
144. See supra Parts III.A.(7); III.B.
145. Alden, 527 U.S. 706.
146. See id. at 717.
147. See id. (quoting 3 DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 533, 555–56 (J. Elliot ed., 2d ed.
1854)).
148. See id.
149. Congress held the first session in New York from March 4, 1789 to September 29, 1789 (although
Congress did not have a quorum until April 1, 1789). Congress also held the second session in New York from
January 4, 1790 to August 12, 1790. Congress held the third session in Philadelphia from December 6, 1790 to
March 3, 1791. See 1 & 2 ANNALS OF CONG. (Joseph Gales ed., 1790) (collecting the debates of the First
Congress).
150. See BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS 1774–1789, at 51–52 (1989)
(listing all members).
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senators and eleven of the representatives served as delegates to the Federal
151
Constitutional Convention. Some of them, like James Madison, Oliver
Ellsworth, and Roger Sherman, played especially prominent roles in the
152
Constitution’s drafting. Other members of the First Congress, like Richard
153
Henry Lee, participated at state ratifying conventions even though they did not
154
participate in the Federal Constitutional Convention. During its two-year term,
155
the First Congress passed an astounding ninety-six acts. Courts often use these
acts to make inferences about the original meaning of the Constitution, assuming
that the First Congress would have known the original meaning and would not
156
have violated the Constitution.
Justice Kennedy has written two opinions in which he has cited the acts of
157
158
the First Congress. In United States v. Locke, as discussed above, the
Supreme Court held that a federal law regarding shipping preempted a state law
159
attempting to regulate the safety of oil tankers. After citing the Federalist
Papers for the proposition that a major goal of the Constitution was to allow
Congress to regulate interstate navigation, Justice Kennedy observed that
Congress immediately exercised this power: “In 1789, the First Congress enacted
a law by which vessels with a federal certificate were entitled to ‘the benefits
granted by any law of the United States.’ Act of Sept. 1, 1789, ch. 11, § 1, 1 Stat.
160
161
162
55.” In Loving v. United States, as discussed above, the Supreme Court
163
rejected a challenge to capital punishment sentencing in the military. Justice
Kennedy mentioned, without placing much weight on the matter, that the
“Articles [of War] adopted by the First Congress placed significant restrictions

151. In the Senate, the former delegates included Oliver Ellsworth (CT), William S. Johnson (CT),
Richard Basset (DE), George Reed (DE), William Few (GA), Caleb Strong (MA), John Langdon (NH), William
Paterson (NJ), Robert Morris (PA), and Pierce Butler (SC). In the House, the former delegates were Roger
Sherman (CT), Abraham Baldwin (GA), Daniel Carroll (MD), Elbridge Gerry (MA), Nicholas Gilman (NH),
Hugh Williamson (NC), George Clymer (PA), Thomas Fitzsimmons (PA), Pierce Butler (SC), and James
Madison (VA). The Supreme Court listed these persons in Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 724 n.3 (1986).
152. See JOHN R. VILE, THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1787: A COMPREHENSIVE
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICA'S FOUNDING 242–50, 428–37, 709–17 (2005) (describing Ellsworth, Madison, and
Sherman's contributions to the Constitutional Convention and Life after the convention).
153. See BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS 1774–1789, supra note 150, at
1449.
154. See id. at 1206 (providing the biography of Richard Henry Lee).
155. See 1 Stat. xvii–xxi (listing these acts by name); id. at 23–226 (providing the full text of these acts).
156. See Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 723–24 (quoting Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 790 (1983)).
157. 529 U.S. 89 (2000).
158. See supra Part III.A.(6).
159. Locke, 529 U.S. at 94.
160. Id. at 99.
161. 517 U.S. 748 (1996).
162. See supra Part III.A.(9).
163. Loving, 517 U.S. at 759.
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164

on court-martial jurisdiction over capital offenses.” These citations provided
background information but were not aimed at resolving specific issues before
165
the Court.
E. Dictionaries from the Founding Era
Judges and Justices sometimes consult dictionaries from the Founding period
to discern the original meaning of the Constitution. For example, in United States
v. Lopez, Justice Thomas cited these dictionaries to determine the meaning of
“commerce” in the Commerce Clause:
At the time the original Constitution was ratified, “commerce” consisted
of selling, buying, and bartering, as well as transporting for these
purposes. See 1 S. Johnson, A Dictionary of the English Language 361
(4th ed. 1773) (defining commerce as “Intercour[s]e; exchange of one
thing for another; interchange of any thing; trade; traffick”); N. Bailey,
An Universal Etymological English Dictionary (26th ed. 1789) (“trade or
traffic”); T. Sheridan, A Complete Dictionary of the English Language
166
(6th ed. 1796) (“Exchange of one thing for another; trade, traffick”).
Justice Kennedy, however, does not appear to have relied on period
dictionaries in any of his opinions; I could find no case in which he had cited
one.
IV. ANALYSIS OF HOW JUSTICE KENNEDY USES SOURCES OF THE
ORIGINAL MEANING
The foregoing description of how Justice Kennedy has cited sources of the
original meaning of the Constitution leads to several observations. First, Justice
Kennedy does not cite sources of the original meaning of the Constitution very
frequently. In his nearly twenty-five years on the bench, Justice Kennedy has
cited the Federalist Papers, the records of the Constitutional Convention, the
records from the state ratifying conventions, and the acts of the First Congress in
only twenty-two cases (twenty-one of which cited the Federalist Papers and one
of which cited the records of the Constitutional convention, but not the Federalist
167
Papers). This comes to an average of less than one citation per year.
Second, Justice Kennedy uses sources of the original meaning of the
Constitution mostly to frame the issues before the Court, not to resolve those
issues. He followed this pattern in eighteen of the twenty-two cases described
164.
165.
166.
167.
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above. Justice Kennedy cited the sources to support general principles, such as:
the federal government is a government of limited powers; the separation of
powers protects individual liberty; Congress has the power to regulate interstate
commerce including navigation; the Constitution seeks to prevent states from
discriminating against interstate commerce; and so forth. These principles were
not contested in the cases and Justice Kennedy did not suggest that they
answered the specific questions before the Court.
Third, although Justice Kennedy does not often use sources of the original
meaning to resolve the ultimate issues in constitutional cases, he is not
categorically opposed to the practice. As indicated above, in Missouri v. Jenkins,
he relied on a statement in the Federalist Papers indicating that courts cannot
168
impose taxes. In Public Citizen, he relied on a passage in the Federalist Papers
169
indicating that Congress could not regulate presidential nominations. In
International Business Machines Corp., he relied on specific statements at the
Federal Constitutional Convention to determine the meaning of the Export
170
Clause. In Alden v. Maine, he relied on a statement at a state ratifying
convention in determining the immunity of states from lawsuits in federal
171
court.
These observations relate directly to the three reasons identified above for
why it might be important to know how Justice Kennedy has relied on sources of
172
the original meaning of the Constitution. One question was whether Justice
Kennedy can be properly characterized as an originalist. The cases quoted above
do not fully answer the question. A complete answer would require a survey to
see whether Justice Kennedy’s conclusions match the original meaning in all of
his cases, regardless of the sources that he cited in reaching his conclusions. But
the citations do shed light on the question. Justice Kennedy clearly thinks that
sources of the original meaning are important for framing constitutional issues.
At times he relies on them to decide the meaning of cases. But it does not appear
that he considers evidence from sources of the original meaning of the
Constitution to be the most important grounds upon which to make constitutional
decisions. A judge more committed to originalist methodology presumably
would rely on the sources of the original meaning of the Constitution to decide
the ultimate issue before the Court in more than four cases over twenty-five
years.
The second question concerned the sorts of arguments that might be
persuasive to Justice Kennedy. Here we can make conclusions about which

168. 495 U.S. 33, 58–82 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); see also
supra Part III.A.
169. 491 U.S. 440, 482–83 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment); see also Part III.A.
170. 517 U.S. 843, 873–74 (1996) (Kennedy, J., dissenting); see also supra Part III.B.
171. 527 U.S. 706, 717 (1999); see also supra Part III.C.
172. See supra Part II.
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sources to cite and the purposes for which sources should be cited. The
observations about how Justice Kennedy uses sources of the original meaning of
the Constitution suggest that Justice Kennedy feels more comfortable with the
173
Federalist Papers than with other sources. Litigants, therefore, should consult
the Federalist Papers for principles that might help their cases. Justice Kennedy
apparently does not see records from the Federal Constitutional Convention, state
ratifying conventions, or the Acts of the First Congress, as pertinent nearly as
174
often. This may be because these other sources typically do not state general
background principles of the kind Justice Kennedy often finds in the Federalist
Papers. And given that Justice Kennedy has not cited Founding-era
175
dictionaries, litigants might infer that he does not find them very persuasive.
Finding evidence in such dictionaries, therefore, is probably not a priority for
litigants seeking Justice Kennedy’s vote.
Sources of the original meaning should be cited to establish background
principles and to frame issues. These citations evidently appeal to Justice
Kennedy because he uses them frequently. Justice Kennedy does not appear to be
opposed to relying on sources of the original meaning to resolve specific issues.
But he apparently has not found them to be persuasive in many cases. Litigants
should feel free to make such arguments but should not rely exclusively on them
if they want to obtain Justice Kennedy’s vote.
The third question concerns the extent to which Justice Kennedy has
contributed to the large increase in the Supreme Court’s reliance on sources of
the original meaning of the Constitution over the past quarter-century. Justice
Kennedy has made a contribution. He has cited these sources in his opinions in
twenty-two cases. But his contribution is limited. He refers to the sources of the
original meaning of the Constitution in less than one case per year, on average.
And when he cites sources of the original meaning of the Constitution, he
generally is explicating general background principles. The sources aid readers in
understanding the issues before the Court, which is important, but Justice
Kennedy seldom uses them for more than that.
V. CONCLUSION
Justice Kennedy now has served on the Supreme Court for almost twentyfive years, about one-ninth of the Court’s 223 years of existence. For many of
these years, he has been the swing vote between two groups on the Court that
have differing judicial philosophies. Accordingly, Justice Kennedy arguably has
had more influence than any of the other Justices. For these reasons, analyzing
the work of Justice Kennedy seems highly appropriate. It may help litigants
173. See supra Part III.A.
174. See supra Part III.B–D.
175. See supra Part III.E.
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before the Court in crafting their arguments, and it may help observers of the
Court to understand the Court’s recent history.
Justice Kennedy has written twenty-two opinions that cite the most common
sources of the original meaning of the Constitution. He relies on the Federalist
Papers more frequently than other sources. He typically uses sources of the
original meaning to introduce constitutional issues and establish basic principles,
rather than to resolve specific issues before the Court. These observations come
directly from looking at the cases Justice Kennedy has decided as described in
this Article. My hope is that they will be helpful to both constitutional scholars
and litigants before the Court.
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